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ABSTRACT
This study examines the conditions that lead mutual funds to
underperform or outperform competitors. Using fuzzy-set qualita-
tive comparative analysis (fsQCA), we draw upon extensive
research on fund returns to affirm and extend earlier discoveries.
Fund performance (Morningstar ratings), features of the funds
themselves, and characteristics of the fund managers are consid-
ered. Positive Morningstar star and analyst ratings are necessary
conditions for funds to generate value (measured by Jensen’s
alpha). Funds with low management fees and low ongoing fees
have attractive Sharpe ratios and high returns. Likewise, large
funds with good Morningstar ratings have good Sharpe ratios
and returns, often when fund managers have short tenures.
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In the social sciences, the research-consuming public repeatedly fails to act upon
widely published findings. This study affirms and extends earlier findings concerning
mutual fund returns and risks, doing so using results from fuzzy-set qualitative com-
parative analysis (fsQCA), a method that scholars rarely employ.
Financial economists have used variants of ordinary least squares (OLS) to exam-
ine mutual fund returns (Kamstra, Kramer, Levi, & Wermers, 2017; Mu~noz, Vicente,
& Ferruz, 2015). The goal is usually to discern whether professional managers add
value to investors. We offer further support to these studies’ principal findings,
namely that few mutual funds outperform tracker indexes or justify their high fees.
This paper compares mutual funds in Europe and the United States. FsQCA over-
comes the assumption of linear relationships when explaining fund returns in terms
of other variables. It provides a tool for making empirical and theoretical inroads
into the debate on factors that influence mutual fund performance and adds value by
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jointly considering the pillars that are used to assess the functioning of mutual funds
but have not yet been analysed in the economic literature.
The mutual fund literature focuses on equity funds. Numerous equity fund studies
have reported return persistence over short periods (Bollen & Busse, 2005; Droms &
Walker, 2001; Gruber, 1996; Malkiel, 1995; Otten & Bams, 2002) and in poor eco-
nomic climates (Carhart, Carpenter, Lynch, & Musto, 2002). Ferson and Schadt
(1996) measured fund performance in changing economic conditions.
Certain studies have shown that positive, abnormal returns are relatively small and
often fail to exceed the funds’ expenses (Droms & Walker, 1995; Jensen, 1968;
Malkiel, 1995; Sharpe, 1966). Paradoxically, the perceived value of active management
dominates the reality: Returns justifying active management are in fact rare. Despite
this paradox, scholars conclude that finding successful funds ex ante is extremely dif-
ficult (Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, & O’Sullivan, 2016). Surprisingly, the industry has con-
tinued to grow.
So why do people invest in managed funds? Ostensibly, such funds add value
through asymmetric information advantages and the fund manager’s skills, thereby
providing positive returns (Agarwal, Mullally, Tang, & Yang, 2015). Daniel, Grinblatt,
Titman, and Wermers (1997) showed that mutual funds exhibit some selectivity abil-
ity. Future fund performance is influenced by fund features and fund manager
characteristics.
Fund ratings offer a way of evaluating funds. For ratings to be useful and valid,
performance should reflect these ratings (Chen, Wang, & Yu, 2014). Some studies
have examined the predictive capacity of certain well-established mutual fund rating
systems for the US market (Blake & Morey, 2000; Sharpe, 1998). Morningstar’s quali-
tative and quantitative ratings are a common investment ratings instrument amongst
investors and managers (Bolster & Trahan, 2013).
Aware of the importance of fund ratings, we assess fund performance as a function
of Morningstar ratings, fund features, the fund manager’s experience, and fund fees.
Methodologically, the use of fsQCA in this study contributes to the literature on fac-
tors that affect mutual fund performance (Ragin, 2006). Comparative methods, which
are based on set theory, seek causal configurations within an empirical data set
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Such methods are unhindered by the assumption that causal
conditions are linear-additive. Net effects must also be analysed. Multiple regression
analysis (MRA) effectively identifies symmetrical relationships, but empirical observa-
tions often conceal other kinds of relationships (Fiss, 2011). Insightful combinations
of conditions usually have asymmetrical relationships with an outcome.
FsQCA focuses on asymmetrical relationships to identify sufficient or necessary
conditions for a certain outcome. FsQCA performs well when causation is complex
and when different conditions yield identical results. Regression coefficients offer little
insight when a high value of any one variable is not always associated with a high
value of the dependent variable (Woodside, 2012a).
In fsQCA, the outcome occurs only when necessary conditions are present. In con-
trast, sufficient conditions always lead to the outcome (Fiss, 2007). FsQCA provides a
novel tool for making empirical and theoretical inroads into the debate on factors
that influence mutual fund performance.
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The paper has the following structure. Section 2 discusses the literature and frames
mutual fund performance in terms of Morningstar ratings, fund features, and fund
manager characteristics. Section 3 describes the data and analysis method. Section 4
presents the results. Section 5 provides the conclusions, limitations, and managerial
implications. Finally, research opportunities are outlined.
2. Literature review
Extensive literature describes mutual fund performance in terms of a wide array of
factors. Our paper extends this body of research, exploring the ability of Morningstar
ratings and other fund features to predict fund performance. These features are fund
size and fund age, the manager’s experience, and fund fees.
2.1. Morningstar star rating
The Morningstar star rating was introduced in 1985 by Morningstar, Inc. Its one- to
five-star scale lets investors easily evaluate funds based on risk-adjusted returns and
distinguish between funds with similar investment strategies (Del Guercio & Tkac,
2008). Sharpe (1998) explored the properties of the rating system, underscoring
its importance.
Star ratings are based on expected utility theory. The assumptions are (1) that
investors are more sensitive to poor outcomes than unexpectedly high returns and (2)
that they are willing to forgo part of the expected return in exchange for greater cer-
tainty of returns. These assumptions offer a prosaic reflection of the classic risk/
return trade-off. Blake and Morey (2000), Blume (1998), and Morey (2002) describe
the Morningstar rating methodology in detail. The rating quantitatively assesses a
fund’s past performance over the past 3, 5, and 10 years. In certain scenarios, estab-
lishing a rating proves impossible. For example, funds that have overhauled their
investment strategy have insufficient data to be awarded a rating. The rankings order
funds by their Morningstar risk-adjusted return scores. The top 10% of funds receive
five stars, the next 22.5% receive four stars, the next 35% receive three stars, the next
22.5% receive two stars, and the bottom 10% of funds receive one star.
The rating overlooks basic mutual fund data such as analyst opinions, fund man-
ager performance, and expense ratios. Accordingly, it assesses the fund’s management
quality but does not predict future performance. Carhart (1997) criticises
Morningstar ratings, noting that the star rating is a backward-looking measure. As
such, it is of limited use to investors because past performance is typically a poor pre-
dictor of future performance. The rating alone provides insufficient data for invest-
ment decisions. Other characteristics that the rating does not cover are key
considerations when choosing a fund. The rating nevertheless flags funds that deserve
potential investors’ attention.
But do Morningstar ratings in some way predict performance? Studies have docu-
mented the importance of star ratings in investor allocation decisions (Del Guercio &
Tkac, 2008; Sirri & Tufano, 1998). New cash flows from investors flock to funds with
good past performance ratings. Babalos, Doumpos, Philippas, and Zopounidis (2015)
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indicate that Morningstar ratings are closely related to the efficiency of the funds.
Jain and Wu (2000) reveal that despite attracting extra cash inflows, funds that adver-
tise above-the-benchmark returns fail to provide superior returns in the following
period. Morningstar affirms in its prospectuses that star ratings are not predictors of
future performance, advocating caution from investors who are keen to extrapolate a
high fund rating to superior future performance. Nevertheless, highly rated funds
experience cash inflows that far exceed the cash outflows experienced by poorly rated
funds (Sirri & Tufano, 1998). Examining performance across funds shows whether
these cash flows are justified by subsequent fund performance (Blake & Morey, 2000).
Using common performance metrics, studies have assessed how well Morningstar
star ratings predict returns. Even before Morningstar’s ratings methodology changed
in 2002, several studies had already showed that high star ratings were poor predic-
tors of future superior performance (Blake & Morey, 2000; Morey, 2005). After 2002,
Gottesman and Morey (2006) found that the rating system had got better at predict-
ing future performance. Kr€aussl and Sandelowsky (2007) refuted these findings,
reporting that predictions based on star ratings could not beat a random walk.
Gerrans (2006) and F€uss, Hille, Rindler, Schmidt, and Schmidt (2010) also failed to
find support for the ratings’ predictive power.
2.2. Morningstar analyst ratings
Investors and advisors operating in the current financial environment need objective,
independent, transparent reports on mutual funds. Qualitative analysis of funds con-
siders overall investment quality and helps investors understand how a particular
fund can contribute to and complement their existing investment portfolios. In 2011,
analyst ratings began to provide overall mutual fund ratings. Based on analysts’ opin-
ions regarding whether funds will outperform benchmarks over the market cycle,
analyst ratings are forward-looking qualitative and quantitative analyses of mutual
funds’ competitive advantages (or shortcomings). A report on each qualified fund
accompanies the Morningstar analyst rating. Analyst ratings identify funds that are
appropriate for particular investor portfolios and risk tolerances (Haslem, 2014).
Morningstar is an independent, well-known, credible source of investment advice,
so the market highly values Morningstar analyst ratings (Bolster & Trahan, 2013).
Ratings may affect investors’ decisions, leading to a fund flow response to ratings.
The impact of analyst ratings on future fund flows may incentivise fund managers to
improve in key areas that undermine their analyst ratings.
Morningstar analysts evaluate five pillars that have proven critical to a fund’s long-
term risk-adjusted performance. Analysts rate each pillar as positive, neutral, or nega-
tive. The fund’s overall rating depends on the following five pillars (Armstrong,
Genc, & Verbeek, 2017):
Parent: The parent company is evaluated in key areas, including shareholder struc-
ture, incentive compensation system, stability of management teams, and corporate
culture. The parent company is important for long-term investment.
People: Many people contribute to the fund’s investment process. The quality
assessment of the management significantly influences the rating. Team experience,
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manager temperament, manager workload, analytical support, incentive structure, and
information flow are amongst the factors that are analysed.
Performance: Does the manager add value? Lucky and talented managers often
resemble one another. Analysts focus on the sources of performance, the risks the
manager has taken, and the performance of the same managers at the helm of
other accounts.
Price: Fees are good predictors of future performance. Understanding whether the
fund offers good value versus similar funds is important.
Process: Strategy is one of the keys to the fund’s success, so analysts evaluate the
fund’s investment strategy and its implementation. They assess whether the strategy
suits the manager’s skillset and the fund’s resources. They also evaluate the risks
attached to the strategy.
Studies suggest that investors consider Morningstar ratings when picking well-per-
forming funds. The result is higher inflow to higher rated funds. Armstrong et al.
(2017) examined investors’ responses to analyst ratings. Overall, ratings influence
investor allocation decisions. But the lack of clarity regarding whether ratings provide
valuable information on long-term performance is a key motivator of the pre-
sent study.
Positive ratings have three levels: Gold, Silver, or Bronze. Neutral and Negative are
the alternative ratings. Negative ratings have only one level, so positive ratings are
more nuanced. By awarding positive ratings to certain funds, Morningstar analysts
express the belief that these funds will outperform competitors in the long term.
Through positive ratings, analysts convey their beliefs regarding funds’ strengths or
weakness. Each analyst rating is now described. The ratings appear in descending
order of expected performance.
 Positive ratings: Gold funds are outstanding. Based on the five assessment pillars,
these funds have earned the analysts’ full conviction that their performance will be
excellent. Silver funds have notable advantages in several but not all of the five pil-
lars. These strengths give analysts a high level of conviction. The advantages of
Bronze funds outweigh the disadvantages. The analysts’ conviction is sufficient for
the fund to warrant a positive rating.
 Neutral ratings: Although the returns of these funds are not excellent, their behav-
iour is no worse than average.
 Negative ratings: These funds have at least one flaw that it is believed will signifi-
cantly affect future performance. They are considered inferior to their peers.
2.3. Performance and fund characteristics
Numerous fund performance studies provide evidence of the relation between per-
formance and fund features such as size, manager tenure, and fees (Cuthbertson
et al., 2016; Golec, 1996). Others, like Agarwal et al. (2015) have affirmed that the
performance decline is more pronounced with greater information asymmetry. We
now discuss these features.
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2.3.1. Fund age
The effect of fund age on performance is unclear (Cremers & Petajisto, 2009;
Cuthbertson et al., 2016; Golec, 1996; Otten & Bams, 2002). Peterson, Petranico,
Riepe, and Xu (2001) and Prather, Bertin, and Henker (2004) showed that younger
funds perform better than older funds or that fund age and performance bear little
relation. Younger funds may focus more on management, but this advantage is coun-
tered by higher start-up costs. Gregory, Matatko, and Luther (1997) suggest that
younger mutual funds’ performance might be affected by an ‘investment learning
period’, reporting that younger funds tend to be smaller than older funds. That
younger funds sometimes outperform older funds is interesting, given that survivor-
ship bias would favour the older funds.
2.3.2. Fund size
Fund size (net assets) influences fund management. The relationship between fund
size and fund performance remains unclear. Numerous investigations of the potential
effect of size on fund performance are inconclusive. Droms and Walker (1995) actu-
ally reported a negative relationship between fund size and performance, explaining
this negative relationship by citing larger funds’ more diversified portfolios, which
have lower risk and consequently lower returns. Babalos, Mamatzakis, and Matousek
(2015) revealed that investors should be aware that larger funds have reduced flexibil-
ity, which offers inferior performance when markets are turbulent.
Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) reported that larger funds offer substantial
savings because of their scale but that fund size actually erodes performance. Basso
and Funari (2017) studied a set of European equity mutual funds and found that
there is no relationship between size and performance but that there is a positive size
effect for large funds in comparison with smaller ones.
Other research also implies that performance deteriorates with fund size
(Kacperczyk & Seru, 2007; Pastor, Stambaugh, & Taylor, 2015; Pollet & Wilson,
2008). Ding, Zheng, and Zhu (2015) provide evidence of a U-shaped relationship
between fund size and performance: As fund size increases, fund performance first
improves but later declines. Some studies have linked fund size to fund fees. For
example, Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2009) noted that larger funds often charge
lower fees. The hypothesis positing the benefits of economies of scale receives little
support from the literature.
2.3.3. Manager tenure
Manager tenure proxies management experience and may influence mutual fund per-
formance. Here, we use the number of years the manager has been managing the
fund to explore links between experience and fund performance. Nevertheless, most
studies have shown that manager tenure has no significant effect on performance
(Costa, Jakob, & Porter, 2006; Costa & Porter, 2003; Switzer & Huang, 2007).
Peterson et al. (2001) suggested that managers that run funds for shorter periods are
usually more alert and have greater incentives to perform. Asal (2016) noted that it is
not possible to determine the managers who will be successful in the future because
investors need to invest ex ante not ex post. In contrast, Filbeck and Tompkins
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(2004) and Golec (1996) have argued that managers with longer tenures perform bet-
ter. Consequently, investors would prefer to invest in funds run by experienced man-
agers. The same researchers reported a significant positive relationship between
management tenure and performance, concluding that managers with more experi-
ence analyse and process information more efficiently, so manager tenure may also
be linked to lower fees. Fund investors learn to avoid excess sales expenses (Ban,
2015). Financial education plays a relevant role in the retail financial market.
Andreu, Sarto, and Serrano (2015) found that younger managers or managers with
shorter fund management careers outperform older managers. The reason for this
finding is that that older managers are more risk averse, whereas younger managers
take greater risks, which lead to greater fund returns. Not all scholars share this opin-
ion, though. For example, Alibakhshi, Reza, and Moghadam (2016) affirmed that an
amateur investor can make similar investments to those of professionals. Other schol-
ars have cited good versus bad luck as a key factor (Ayadi, Ben-Ameur, &
Kryzanowski, 2016; Ayadi, Chaibi, & Kryzanowski, 2016; Blake, Caulfield, Ioannidis,
& Tonks, 2017). Andreu and Puetz (2017) affirmed that individuals with university
degrees can be found at either extreme: outstanding returns or devastating losses. In
contrast, individuals with two university degrees are more cautious investors and take
fewer risks, so they achieve more modest returns. Finally, Andreu, Gargallo, Salvador,
and Sarto (2015) argued that everything depends on the emotional and rational fac-
tors that lie behind decisions, so the traditional model based on the laws of the mar-
ket (i.e., prices offer a source of information) ceases to be efficient.
2.3.4. Fund fees
Typically, mutual fund cost is measured by the ongoing charge figure, which is the
sum of all fees charged by the fund that are deducted from the fund’s net asset value.
The mutual fund literature commonly treats the management fee separately to analyse
the relationship between management fees and performance. The way that mutual
fund performance and fund fees relate to one another tests the value of active man-
agement. Mutual fund investors pay for the benefits associated with the costs of this
investment. The manager’s skill should be reflected in better performance, which jus-
tifies a higher management fee. In some cases, high management fees signify superior
investment skill, which leads to better performance (Golec, 1996). In fact, the manag-
er’s skill may shape the relationship between fees and fund performance. Berkowitz
and Kotowitz (2002) report a positive relationship between fees and performance by
funds managed by good managers. In contrast, for low-quality managers, the relation-
ship between fees and performance is negative.
The literature on the relationship between fees and performance is inconclusive.
Droms and Walker (1996) reported a significant positive relationship between fund
returns and fees. Overall, however, scarce empirical evidence supports the expected
positive relationship between performance and fees. Gruber (1996) reported that fees
for the top performing funds are no higher than they are for other funds, also argu-
ing that investors are motivated to buy actively managed funds and pay their fees
because past performance can partially predict future performance.
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Ban (2015) confirmed that higher sales expenses are not related to better perform-
ance. Anagol, Marisetty, Sane, and Venugopal (2017) found that reducing commis-
sions would slow the growth of the mutual funds market. Carhart (1997) and Golec
(1996) reported that higher fees are actually associated with lower investment per-
formance. Otten and Bams (2002) listed different types of fees and reported a nega-
tive relationship between European mutual fund performance and these fees.
3. Data and method
3.1. Empirical data
Morningstar classifies mutual funds according to asset investment policy. Funds are
classified according to their current management style rather than the management
regulation. This classification adheres more to the actual policy of the fund than to
any statement by the manager. In September 2016, we collected mutual fund data
from the Morningstar mutual fund database. The sample comprised funds that
invested in large-cap US equities and large-cap Eurozone equities only. Sampled
funds had to have Morningstar ratings and Morningstar analyst ratings. Data were
available for 224 mutual funds, 60 of which invested in the Eurozone and 164 of
which invested in the US.
All funds had their registered offices in Luxembourg. Luxembourg is the largest
fund domicile in Europe and the second largest worldwide (after the United States).
Luxembourg offers managers operational ease, favourable fiscal conditions, and a low
level of bureaucracy. Registering funds is simpler in Luxembourg than it is elsewhere,
reducing registration costs. The Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry
(ALFI) promotes Luxembourg’s status as a leading international fund hub that invest-
ors, policymakers, and industry representatives consider open, reliable, and innova-
tive. According to the ALFI Annual Report 2015–2016, net assets under management
at the end of 2015 were e3.5 trillion, and 45.75% of all net sales in Europe were
attributed to Luxembourg-domiciled funds.
The Morningstar mutual fund database provides data on fund size (net assets), age
(years since creation), and fees. Management fees and ongoing fees were considered
in this study. The management fee is the amount the fund manager charges for man-
aging the fund. The fee is subject to a legal cap. It is automatically deducted daily
from the net asset value of the fund. The ongoing fee consists of all fund fees that
are deducted from the fund’s net asset value. It is calculated as total charges divided
by net assets. Morningstar takes these data from managers’ reports. We also gathered
data on the fund manager to assess the influence of the manager’s experience on
fund performance. The Morningstar database provided the number of years the man-
ager had been managing the fund. Thus, the set of causal conditions leading to the
outcome of high (or low) performance comprised two Morningstar ratings and five
features of mutual funds and their managers.
To quantify managed mutual fund performance, the average annual return over
three years and two traditional portfolio performance metrics—the Sharpe ratio and
Jensen’s alpha—were used. Whereas the Sharpe ratio considers the fund’s total risk,
Jensen’s alpha considers only the fund’s systematic risk (Morningstar, Inc, 2009). The
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performance measures (return and risk-adjusted return) were based on three years of
monthly returns. For each Morningstar category, Morningstar uses standard bench-
marks and the index from the fund’s prospectus. The standard benchmark for
Eurozone mutual funds is the MSCI EMU NR EUR index. Standard benchmarks for
US mutual funds are the Russell 1000 TR USD indices.
3.2. Method
Conditions and combinations of conditions are studied using the configurational
comparative method (Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993). Configurational approaches are
built on the concept of equifinality, which treats configurations as different types of
causes that lead to an outcome. Studying the combination of causes or their absence
has current real-world applicability (Ragin, 2008).
The sample limitations in social science research also make the configurational
comparative method a good technique for reaching reliable conclusions when work-
ing with a small number of cases (Collier, 1993; Fiss, 2007; Vassinen, 2012). Its use
can nonetheless be extended to larger samples (Ragin, 2006b). For Rihoux and Ragin
(2009), the number of causal conditions should be between three and eight; Crilly
(2011) confirmed that up to seven causal conditions could be studied.
Such methods are used to examine how conditions (or variables) combine to create
outcomes. Regression and linear regression analysis are not applicable in turbulent
economic environments such the current one because this form of analysis maintains
the values of all except one of the variables constants in the equation to explain varia-
tions in some outcome. In fsQCA, conditions may be present or absent (Ragin,
2000), as explained below.
As a configurational comparative method, fsQCA builds on set theory to investi-
gate causal claims (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Configurational theory has a long history
as a data analysis method. Roig-Tierno, Gonzalez-Cruz, and Llopis-Martinez (2017)
conducted a bibliometric analysis of the three variants of QCA (csQCA, fsQCA, and
mvQCA), reporting a positive trend in fsQCA use. Finance research based on config-
urational theory has appeared in top journals. Recently, there has been a surge in the
use of comparative methodologies in management research (e.g., Crespo-Hervas,
Calabuig-Moreno, Prado-Gasco, A~no-Sanz, & Nu~nez-Pomar, 2019). Methodological
innovations in QCA create new opportunities for analysis and enrich methodological
pluralism in research (Kornelakis, 2018).
In this research, fsQCA is used to identify the conditions associated with mutual
funds than underperform or outperform competitors. FsQCA is useful when cases are
best understood as combinations (or configurations) of attributes that potentially lead
to an outcome.
3.3. Why use a fuzzy-set approach in this study?
We contribute methodologically to research on what influences mutual fund perform-
ance by testing our conceptual model using a configurational comparative technique,
namely fsQCA. This approach identifies causal configurations from a data set of
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empirical cases (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). FsQCA deals with complex causal perspec-
tives (Greckhamer, Misangyi, Elms, & Lacey, 2008) and focuses on asymmetric rela-
tionships to report causal conditions that are sufficient to cause an outcome (similar
to the concept of the dependent variable in other analyses). FsQCA has advantages
for studying complex causation and identical outcomes (Mills, van de Bunt, & De
Bruijn, 2006). Regression coefficients show the impact of variables; they do not indi-
cate which individual variables are sufficient or necessary for an outcome (Woodside,
Ko, & Huan, 2012). Necessary and sufficient conditions are analysed under a complex
causal approach. Necessary conditions imply that the outcome only occurs when the
causal condition is present (or absent). The analysis also considers sufficient condi-
tions. Sufficient conditions indicate that a causal condition always leads to the out-
come (Braumoeller & Goertz, 2000; Fiss, 2007).
The within-case analysis (Yin, 1994) was important to identify the relationships
that we later tested using fs/QCA software. Use of configurational theory as a data
analysis method is a recent phenomenon. Using this method, scholars have published
research in top international management or social science journals (Roig-Tierno
et al., 2017; Urue~na, Arenas, & Hidalgo, 2018). The method is based on algorithms
and Boolean algebra.
3.4. Procedure
We use fs/QCA Version 3.0 software, available at www.fsQCA.com. (Ragin & Davey,
2016). Qualitative comparative analysis proceeds in several steps (Rihoux & Ragin,
2009). The first step is to calibrate set membership. The aim is to group cases (Ragin,
2008). Degree of membership of observations in fuzzy sets is evaluated for each con-
dition. Set membership scores are not probabilities (Woodside, 2012a). Independent
and dependent measures are transformed into sets. For many variables, binary values
of 0 and 1 would be appropriate, and crisp sets could be used. Other variables are
more complex and require ordinal or continuous values. For these variables, fuzzy
sets should be based on substantive knowledge (Vis, 2012). Here, the researcher
decides on three breakpoints: when a case is ‘fully in’ the set (1.00) or full member-
ship, ‘fully out’ of the set (0.00) or full non-membership, and ‘neither in nor out’ of
the set (0.50) or the cross-over point. The cross-over point is the point of maximum
(membership) ambiguity in the assessment of whether a case is more in or out of a
set (Ragin, 2008). These breakpoints enable the calibration of values into membership
values; they are based on theoretical knowledge of previous situations. This technique
is a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.
The second step is to build a data matrix, which is known as the truth table
(Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, & Paunescu, 2010; Fiss, 2011; Schneider & Wagemann,
2012). Researchers should keep configurations with at least one observation for fur-
ther analysis. Kenworth and Hicks (2008) have recommended a consistency threshold
of 0.95, although this threshold should not be applied mechanically. Ragin (2008)
argued that the analysis should capture at least 75% to 80% of cases. In the process
of obtaining the solution, researchers should select the prime implicants with the
most significance in managerial decision making.
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In the third step, Boolean algebra is used to derive combinations of causal condi-
tions that produce the outcome. These conditions are minimally sufficient. The fs/
QCA software uses the Quine-McCluskey algorithm (Quine, 1955). The truth table
algorithm provides three solutions: complex, parsimonious, and intermediate (Ragin,
2008). The complex solution is the most conservative solution, although it provides
little insight into causal configurations. Complex solutions do not consider logical
remainders, so researchers generally do not use this solution in their analyses. The
parsimonious solution includes all simplifying assumptions. The intermediate solution
includes simplifying assumptions and restricts logical remainders to only those that
are most plausible. The parsimonious and intermediate solutions should be reported
in most analyses.
Researchers must decide between the parsimonious and intermediate solutions,
using the coverage and consistency (of each configuration) to reach this decision.
Woodside (2012b) showed that the coverage index is analogous to the coefficient of
determination and that the consistency index is analogous to correlation. Ragin
(2008, p. 44) noted that coverage is ‘the degree to which a cause or causal combin-
ation [accounts for] instances of an outcome’, and consistency is ‘the degree to which
instances of the outcome agree in displaying the causal condition thought to be
necessary’. Consistency can range from 0 to 1 (Ragin, 2006a). Ragin (2008) has rec-
ommended a minimum measure of consistency of 0.8 (preferably 0.85 for macro-level
data).
4. Results
Table 1 shows the conditions and outcomes. The literature review justifies their rele-
vance. Their measurement is explained in the empirical data section. Table 1 shows
the anchors used to calibrate each condition and outcome following the direct
method proposed by Ragin (2008). The consistency cut-off was 0.80 (Rihoux &
Ragin, 2009).
We analysed the models presented in Table 2.
4.1. Necessary conditions
The analysis of necessary conditions identifies causal conditions that must occur for
the outcome to occur. Only fs_morn and fs_anal were necessary for the outcomes
‘sharpe’, ‘alpha’, and ‘profit’ in models 7, 8, and 9 (Table 3). No other individual con-
dition was necessary for any other outcome. Conditions are necessary only if their
consistency exceeds 0.9 (Schneider et al., 2010).
The results show that relationships of necessity emerge for Europe but not for the
US. Furthermore, these relationships emerge for the presence of just three outcomes
for the conditions of Morningstar rating and Analyst rating.
First, for the outcome Sharpe, coverage was 0.542 (consistency 0.975) for
Morningstar rating and 0.588 (consistency 0.991) for Analyst rating. Second, for the
outcome Alpha, coverage was 0.548 (consistency 0.970) for Morningstar rating and
0.595 (consistency 0.987) for Analyst rating. Finally, for the outcome Profit, coverage
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was 0.521 (consistency 0.971) for Morningstar rating and 0.564 (consistency 0.984)
for Analyst rating.
4.2. Sufficient conditions for the outcomes
We compared the results for the US with those for Europe only when the models for
both the US and Europe met Ragin (2008) and Woodside’s (2012) criterion regarding
Table 1. Outcomes and conditions.
Condition or Outcome Description fsQCA threshold
fs_morn Condition Morningstar rating. Uses a scale of 1–5
stars to evaluate funds using the




fs_anal Condition Analyst rating. Summary expression of
Morningstar’s forward-looking
analysis of a fund. It assigns ratings
on a 5-tier scale: Gold, Silver,




fs_fund_size Condition Fund size. Measured by net assets. 3658.22 ! 0.95
1311.44 ! 0.5
560.66 ! 0.05





fs_years_mgt Condition Years in management. Seniority of the






fs_mgt_charge Condition Management fees. Fee charged by the





fs_ong_charge Condition Ongoing charge. All expenses incurred





fs_sharpe Outcome Sharpe ratio. Performance measure
based on the fund’s total risk.
Perc. 90 ! 0.95
Perc. 50 ! 0.5
Perc. 10 ! 0.05
fs_alpha Outcome Jensen’s alpha ratio. Performance
measure based on the fund’s
systematic risk.
Perc. 90 ! 0.95
Perc. 50 ! 0.5
Perc. 10 ! 0.05
fs_profit Outcome Profit (return). Mutual fund average
annual return.
Perc. 90 ! 0.95
Perc. 50 ! 0.5
Perc. 10 ! 0.05
Table 2. Models.
Region Outcome Conditions Model
US sharpe Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 1
alpha Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 2
profit Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 3
 sharpe Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 4
 alpha Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 5
 profit Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 6
Europe sharpe Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 7
alpha Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 8
profit Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 9
 sharpe Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 10
 alpha Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 11
 profit Morn, Anal, Fund_Size; Years_Incep; Years_Mgt; Mgt_Charge; Ong_Charge 12
Note: The symbol () represents the absence of a condition.
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consistency values. This criterion states that consistency must be greater than 0.8. We
could only compare the results for the outcomes ‘absence of Sharpe ratio’ and ‘profit’.
4.2.1. Sufficient conditions for the absence of Sharpe ratio
Table 4 shows the sufficient conditions for the absence of Sharpe ratio. We compared
the results for the US with those for Europe because the models for both the US and
Europe met Ragin (2008) and Woodside’s (2012) criterion regarding consistency
Table 3. Analysis of necessary conditions for the models.
















































Source: Authors’ calculation based on the Morningstar mutual fund database.
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values. This criterion states that consistency must be greater than 0.8. The consistency
was 0.767 for the US model and 0.882 for the model for Europe.
For US funds, according to Configuration 4, 28.2% of cases imply that a poor
Sharpe ratio is assigned when funds do not have good Morningstar ratings, do not
have good analyst ratings, do not have low management fees, and do not have low
ongoing fees, but have existed for many years. This finding was confirmed with a
consistency of 0.898. Accordingly, for this configuration, Ragin (2008) and
Woodside’s (2012) criterion was met.
For European funds, according to Configuration 1, 54.1% of cases imply that a
poor Sharpe ratio is assigned when funds are not large, but fund managers have a
long tenure. This finding was confirmed with a consistency of 0.866. Accordingly, for
this configuration, Ragin (2008) and Woodside’s (2012) criterion was met.
Comparing US and European funds reveals that the primary difference is that
funds in both scenarios have poor Sharpe ratios when fund managers have a long
tenure but US funds do not have low ongoing fees and are not large.
4.2.2. Sufficient conditions for profit
Table 5 shows the sufficient conditions for the outcome Profit. We compared the
results for the US with those for Europe because both models met Ragin (2008) and
Woodside’s (2012) criterion for consistency values. This criterion states that consist-
ency must exceed 0.8. Consistency was 0.783 for the US model and 0.935 for the
European model.
For US funds, according to Configuration 3, 26.2% of cases imply that funds
achieve a good Profit when they have good Morningstar ratings, good analyst ratings,
a large size, low management fees, and low ongoing fees. This finding was confirmed
by a consistency of 0.923. Accordingly, for this configuration, Ragin (2008) and
Woodside’s (2012) criterion was met.
For European funds, according to Configuration 2, 34.1% of cases imply that funds
achieve a good Profit when they have good Morningstar ratings, good analyst ratings,
a large size, managers with long tenures, low management fees, and low ongoing fees.
Table 4. Sufficient conditions for the absence of Sharpe ratio.
Model 4. (US) fs_Sharpe¼ f (fs_Morning, fs_Anal, fs_Fund_Size; fs_Years_Incep; fs_Years_Mgt; fs_Mgt_Charge;
fs_Ong_Charge)
incl cov.r cov.u
1 FS_YEARS_MGTFS_ONG_CHARGE_INV 0.719 0.384 0.132
2 FS_MORNINGFS_FUND_SIZEFS_YEARS_INCEPFS_ONG_CHARGE_INV 0.834 0.462 0.087





Model 10. (EU) fs_Sharpe¼ f (fs_Morning, fs_Anal, fs_Fund_Size; fs_Years_Incep; fs_Years_Mgt; fs_Mgt_Charge;
fs_Ong_Charge)
incl cov.r cov.u
1 FS_FUND_SIZEFS_YEARS_MGT 0.866 0.541 0.520
2 FS_ANALFS_FUND_SIZEFS_YEARS_INCEPFS_YEARS_MGT 0.990 0.115 0.094
M 0.882 0.635
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the Morningstar mutual fund database.
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This finding was confirmed by a consistency value of 0.943. Accordingly, for this con-
figuration, Ragin (2008) and Woodside’s (2012) criterion was met.
Comparing US and European funds reveals that the primary difference is that
funds in both scenarios achieve good profits under the same conditions, except that
European funds must also have managers with long tenures.
5. Conclusions
Mutual fund performance is discussed at length in the finance literature. There has
been extensive research into the relationships between fund ratings, specific fund fea-
tures, and performance. Numerous studies have investigated the features of mutual
funds and characteristics of fund managers that influence fund performance. Despite
the overall finding that fund fees are generally unjustified by subsequent performance,
scholars have nonetheless failed to reach a consensus regarding the positive or nega-
tive impacts of different factors. These factors invite further investigation into areas
such as the clustering of fund managers depending on whether they base their deci-
sions on publicly available information or data that are less easily accessible to the
general public (Abdesaken, 2015).
Methodologically, this paper contributes to economics and finance research
through its application of fsQCA. Using complexity theory, researchers can test mod-
els where no single condition is responsible for the outcome. Instead, we analysed
several conditions to observe how they combine to contribute to the outcome. We
used fsQCA to identify the combinations of factors that lead to our outcome of
choice (Ragin, 2008), instead of isolating the net and independent effects of single
factors on a particular outcome.
Complexity theory helps provide answers when certain conditions cause an out-
come (Feurer, Baumbach, & Woodside, 2016). No simple conditions are the cause of
an outcome of interest. In our study, this outcome is the influence on mutual fund
performance. As Kostova and Zaheer (1999) stated, international business is a
Table 5. Sufficient conditions for the Profit.
Model 3. (US) fs_Profit¼ f (fs_Morning, fs_Anal, fs_Fund_Size; fs_Years_Incep; fs_Years_Mgt; fs_Mgt_Charge;
fs_Ong_Charge)
incl cov.r cov.u











Model 9. (EU) fs_Profit¼ f (fs_Morning, fs_Anal, fs_Fund_Size; fs_Years_Incep; fs_Years_Mgt; fs_Mgt_Charge;
fs_Ong_Charge)
incl cov.r cov.u





Source: Authors’ calculation based on the Morningstar mutual fund database.
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causally complex phenomenon. Pratt (2009) reported that number of interviews or
observations that should be conducted in a qualitative research project depends on
the question that researchers seek to answer.
One of the relevant points of regression analysis is that researchers do not require
data calibration or prior causal knowledge. In addition, researchers do not need
knowledge or previous theories for the regression analysis. In contrast, set member-
ship is determined by substantive knowledge in fsQCA (rather than using the sam-
ple mean).
Unlike standard econometric methods, sample representativeness is less of an issue
in fuzzy-set methods. FsQCA does not rest on assumptions that data are drawn from
a certain probability distribution (Woodside 2012b). The possible combinations of
individual and group attributes may be infinite, but only a finite number of coherent
configurations are prevalent in the real world.
We examined the performance of Luxembourg-domiciled mutual funds that invest
in large-cap US and Eurozone equities. A configurational comparative method,
fsQCA, identified the combinations of conditions that lead to mutual funds’ under-
performance or outperformance of competitors.
A poor Sharpe ratio for US funds is assigned when the funds do not have good
Morningstar ratings, do not have good analyst ratings, do not have low management fees,
and do not have low ongoing fees, but have existed for many years. A poor Sharpe ratio
for European funds is assigned when the funds are not large, but fund managers have a
long tenure. Comparing US and European funds reveals that the main difference is that
both US and European funds have poor Sharpe ratios when fund managers have a long
tenure but US funds do not have low ongoing fees and are not large.
US funds achieve good Profit when they have good Morningstar ratings, good ana-
lyst ratings, large size, low management fees, and low ongoing fees. European funds
achieve good Profit when they have good Morningstar ratings, good analyst ratings,
large size, low management fees, low ongoing fees, and managers with long tenures.
Comparing US and European funds reveals that the main difference is that both US
and European funds achieve good profit under the same conditions, except that
European funds must also have managers with long tenures.
All stakeholders in the performance of mutual funds (i.e., government regulators,
investors, and investment managers) have an interest in better understanding mutual
fund performance. They may find the results of our research helpful in their delibera-
tions about mutual funds with criteria of good performance.
From a regulator’s perspective, the purpose of knowing the conditions that affect
the performance of funds is to evaluate the relevance of including information on
these conditions in the advertising of managers. For investors, the mutual fund mar-
ket is large and offers a wide variety of assets in which to invest. Therefore, investors
will consider the values of these conditions for potentially selectable funds as key
aspects in their fund selection decisions. This research verifies the importance of
Morningstar ratings and analyst ratings in mutual funds to avoid poor performance.
The achievement of good ratings constitutes an incentive for fund managers to
improve their advertising. Managers should spare no effort in carrying out policies
and actions to improve the ratings assigned to the mutual funds they manage.
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Like all studies, this study has certain limitations. The primary limitation relates to
the sample, which comprised firms from a specific asset class. In addition, the study
examined data for a short period. Future fsQCA studies could cover other mutual
fund categories in other investment areas. Verifying whether our results can be con-
firmed for broader horizons would also be of interest.
A promising line of future research would be to explore whether any additional
conditions may contradict our findings. Recent research applied to other sectors has
linked performance to areas such as innovation (Ho, Nguyen, Adhikari, Miles, &
Bonney, 2018), business intelligence capacities (Caseiro & Coelho, 2019), decision-
making style (Abubakar, Elrehail, Alatailat, & Elçi, 2019), and employee relations cli-
mate (Ali, Lei, & Wei, 2018). As with any study of this nature, the robustness of the
results invites further inspection.
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